Empires, globalizations, and historical sociology: an interview with Michael Mann by Jerónimo, Miguel Bandeira
INTERVIEW WITH
MICHAEL MANN
Empires, globalizations, and historical sociology:
an interview with Michael Mann
by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo
Análise Social, 209, xlviii (4.º), 2013
issn online 2182-2999
edição e propriedade
Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa. Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9
1600-189 Lisboa Portugal — analise.social@ics.ul.pt

INTERVIEW
Empires, globalizations, and historical sociology:
an interview with Michael Mann
Interview with Michael Mann
by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo
I n this brief but revealing interview with Professor Michael Mann we address and assess the fundamental novelties offered by volumes iii and iv of his magnum opus The Sources of Social Power, focusing on two main issues. First, we emphasize conceptual and analyti-
cal questions. Second, we highlight two of the major themes of volumes iii and iv: the polymor-
phous and segmental empires and globalizations, their historical formation and relationship. 
We conclude by asking Professor Mann about his take on Historical Sociology, a crucial yet 
downplayed tradition in Human and Social Sciences. Michael Mann’s work is a clear demon-
stration of the imperative to recognize the centrality of this tradition. It is also an exemplary 
contribution to all the efforts that seek to place Historical Sociology at the fore of our individual 
and collective intellectual research.1
✳
miguel bandeira jerónimo  What do you consider to be the main innova-
tions brought about by volumes iii and iv of The Sources of Social Power to your 
model and its conceptual and analytic specificities?
michael mann  My volumes iii and iv deploy the model of power set out in 
the first chapter of my first volume, published in 1986. I see control over four 
1 For a fascinating conversation between two great historical sociologists of our time, see 
Mann and Hall (2011). See also the reply given by Michael Mann to the constructive criticism 
offered apropos his work by several important sociologists, historians and political scientists 
(such as Jack A. Goldstone, Randall Collins, John M. Hobson, and Gianfranco Poggi) in Hall 
and Schroeder (2006, pp. 343-396).
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power sources as crucial to the exercise of both distributive power (over  others) 
and collective power (exercised jointly and in cooperation with others). A few 
amendments have been made to the model. I have clarified the difference 
between political and military power. Political power is the institutionaliza-
tion of power relations over a given territory, backed up by mostly non-lethal, 
routinized and rule-governed coercion. Military power is the deployment of 
lethal violence which is aimed deliberately at terrifying, killing, and wounding 
people, and which is minimally or not at all institutionalized or rule-governed. 
Geopolitics lies between the two and can be either an extension of political 
or military power, according to whether inter-state relations contain matters 
of peace or war. The former are subject to negotiated rules and international 
courts and tribunals, the latter are not. Ideological power remains the control 
of broad meaning systems which aim to transform the world (and some of 
them do so). It is emphatically not the whole of “culture”, which I regard as too 
diffuse and fuzzy to permit much causal analysis. Economic power remains 
almost entirely unchanged. In these two volumes I apply this model to a period 
roughly between 1890 and the present-day, though for empires I start earlier 
and my end deals with 21st century futures. I have sought to explain the devel-
opment of human society in this period in terms of the relations between the 
four sources of social power, especially as institutionalized in the organizations 
of capitalism, empires, and nation-states.
In your introduction to Global Empires and Revolution, 1890-1945 (the third 
volume of The Sources of Social Power) you reassess the main principles and 
analytic guidelines set out in your first volume. Pondering the causes and dyna-
mics of social change, and more particularly in relation with the model of punc-
tuated equilibrium, you stress the idea that ideological, economic, military, and 
political powers “differ from each other orthogonally”. Is this a novelty, and to 
what extent?
All four power sources interact, yet each has a degree of autonomy from the 
others, and they usually involve different geographical networks of interac-
tion. In volume iii I introduce the notion that their relations are “orthogonal” 
to each other: each source has a different internal logic of development and 
though these interact with and influence each other, these inter-relations are 
not determinant. There is no overall social system. The major ideologies of 
modern social life – religions, communism, fascism, liberalism, etc. – emerge 
in response to crises in the relations between the other three sources. Yet once 
emergent, they have autonomous power of their own. Similarly, political power 
relations are in a historical sense merely the institutionalization of the other 
power sources over a specific territory, yet once established they also have 
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their own emergent autonomy. By the time I reached into volumes iii and iv 
I abandoned all hope that my final theory might be able to rank the sources of 
social power in terms of their overall causal power. There is no determination 
“in the last instance” – unless military or economic power relations destroyed 
the world. Causality varies by time and space, so that each power source can 
appear to be primary in different periods and places. But I have been able to 
end volume iv with an overall statement of the essential nature of each of the 
four power sources and what each is capable of.
And from a methodological point of view, what new problems and insights emer-
ged while conceiving volumes iii and iv?
Methodologically, volume iii and especially volume iv cover periods which 
see an exponential explosion of evidence available to the historical sociologist. 
It has become much more difficult to handle this abundance of data. I have 
had to be much more selective of the themes and places which I investigate. 
However, more evidence brings advantages too. For example, we can be much 
clearer about the causes, processes, and consequences of World War i than was 
the case for earlier wars, and in turn we know more about World War ii than its 
predecessor. Similarly we understand much more about the causes, processes, 
reactive policies, and consequences of the Great Depression of the 1930s than 
we do about the Depression of the 1870s.
Such detailed knowledge has led me to a theoretical shift. Knowledge of the 
minutia of decision-making has given me more appreciation of the capacity 
of humans to act in emotional and irrational ways. I had begun this shift in 
my book The Dark Side of Democracy (2005) in which I had sought to explain 
bouts of murderous ethnic cleansing. Volumes iii and iv apply this at a more 
macro-level. Events rarely turn out as planned and they involve consider-
able raw emotions and persistent misperceptions, misunderstandings, and 
mistakes that change the course of history in both big and small ways. In the 
modern period I am able to study great crises in ways which had not been pos-
sible in previous periods. These might all have been faced up to in a different 
and better way. In these crises the decisions and emotions of individuals or 
small groups, especially those in leadership positions, can change the course 
of history. Volume iii discusses the development of the crises involved in the 
two world wars, two great revolutions (in Russia and China), and the Great 
Depression. Volume iv discusses the crises of the Cold War, American impe-
rial policy in the Third World, and the Great Recession of 2008, and its last 
chapters discuss the three great crises which are likely to worsen in the future 
– of global capitalism, nuclear war, and climate change. It explores possible 
alternative ways in which they might be handled in the future.
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In the iii volume you finally bring empires back to the table: the “globalization 
of multiple empires” was one of the main historical institutional processes of 
“modern globalization”, alongside the “globalization of capitalism” and the “glo-
balization of nation-states”. Can you summarize the advantages that this analy-
tical operation brought to your previous assessments?
Volume ii had focused narrowly on the homelands of the Great Powers in 
Europe and America. My volume iii corrects that by focusing on the Euro-
pean empires, especially the British Empire, plus the late-comer empires of 
the Americans and Japanese. Both volumes focus on China and Russia as well 
as the West and Japan. I make clear that during the whole of the period up to 
1945 not nation-states but empires were the dominant political form for most 
of the world’s population. Empires enable us to see more clearly that global-
ization was never a singular process. Not only were the globalizations of the 
four power sources normally out of sync with each other, but the fact that 
there were eleven of them – produced globalizations that were “segmental”, 
to a degree segregated from each other. For example, though capitalism did 
push outwards transnationally, to wherever profit could be made in markets, 
capitalism was also partially constrained within the sphere of interest of each 
empire. The Gold Coast (now Ghana) traded mostly with Britain, not with the 
neighboring Ivory Coast, which in turn traded mostly with France, its mother 
country. Today the main language of Ghana is English while its neighbor 
speaks French. The effects of segmental globalizations (plural) are still evident 
today.
And in volume iv, Globalizations, 1945–2011?
In volume iv the emphasis shifts away from empires toward nation-states. 
Of course, the homelands of the empires had been developing steadily as 
national states through the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, 
but it was after World War ii that all empires except one collapsed, and were 
replaced by 192 polities calling themselves nation-states. Once again, these 
multiple segments partially constrain the expansion of capitalism. For exam-
ple, the rise of neoliberalism has usually been treated as a global phenome-
non curtailing the power of all nation-states. Quite to the contrary, I show 
that its penetration has been highly uneven according to whether particular 
nation-states (some of them members of what I call “macro-regions”, like the 
Anglophone or Nordic countries) offer neoliberalism a hospitable environ-
ment. Moreover, if the goal of neoliberalism was to cut down the size of the 
state, then it failed, since the ratio of government spending to gdp across the 
world has remained more or less constant since the 1970s. In this post-war 
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in the globalization of the nation-state. They simply neither undermine nor 
reinforce one another, for they are still related orthogonally. This also means 
that the golden age of the nation-state was not in the past, as many have argued. 
Instead it has lasted from around 1950 to the present-day, and will last a good 
while longer yet.
Your work is one of the most important examples of the intellectual benefits that 
can be derived from the interplay between sociology and history, some of their 
traditions, languages, and methods. Briefly, how do you appreciate the current 
relationship between both disciplines?
My methods obviously combine a sociological with a historical approach. This 
is uncommon today though it was common in the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies. Historical sociology is still a rather small slice of sociology, though it 
does include some of the most prominent sociologists. One particular neglect 
is that very few sociologists concern themselves with war and military rela-
tions. This is bizarre when one considers that the last hundred years have con-
tained two world wars and eleven militaristic empires, one of which still seeks 
to dominate the world by military means. In contrast there have always been 
many military historians, though they are usually more concerned with nar-
rative rather than theory, and they tend to focus more on the development of 
military technologies and tactics than on the social organization of war-mak-
ing. Yet the subject area that has become known as “world history” has seen 
considerable recent expansion, driven by both real world globalization pro-
cesses and by the relative decline of the West. I welcome the arrival of these 
historians. At the end of the day, however, I remain more of a sociologist than 
a historian. I love the narrative method (used by almost all historians but very 
few sociologists), because temporal analysis leads implicitly or explicitly to 
causal analysis and because it produces a more readable and often quite vivid 
text. Yet I always attempt to put narrative in the service of sociological theory. 
I hope the general reader will appreciate this.
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